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Abstract
It is well known that smoking causes severe adverse health effects, and it
seems evident that governments are justified or even obliged to implement
measures of tobacco control to mitigate these effects.Yet,as this paper argues
with a distinct focus on Germany, the three most important and still largely
open questions in the design and implementation of economic and health pol-
icy are,whether government action is justified at all,what behavioral patterns
this policy should try to alter,and whether the policy measures chosen indeed
exert any substantial effects on the targeted outcomes. We conclude that the
case for control measures aiming at the prevention of smoking initiation
among adolescents is indeed strong, but also that their proper design would
benefitfromabetterunderstandingofbehavioralissuesandthattheirempiri-
cal evaluation requires (non-experimental) study designs that facilitate the
identification of causal effects.
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1 The Problem
There is hardly any dispute today that tobacco consumption impairs health and
well-being and tends to reduce life time. Based on this fundamental insight, many
observers conclude that the authorities should actively try to reduce tobacco con-
sumption by implementing health information campaigns and regulations (Deutsches
Krebsforschungszentrum, 2002). Yet, it is far from obvious, whether the state should
interfere with any self-destructive decisions of its citizens. As long as all costs of self-
destructive activities are fully internalized and smoking behavior reﬂects a rational
trade-oﬀ between individual beneﬁts and costs, the justiﬁcation for intervention is
missing. Moreover, it is unclear whether such measures indeed have the potential
to alter smoking behavior. Even well-justiﬁed and carefully implemented measures
might fail. The answers to these questions depend on informational and behavioral
aspects of take-up, habit formation and exit.
Before these behavioral questions could be addressed, though, the ﬁrst step would
necessarily be a thorough assessment of magnitude and structure of the phenomenon.
Undoubtedly, the death toll linked to tobacco consumption is remarkable. Yet,
even a high number of smoking-related deaths is not very informative regarding the
associated health burden. This burden would be quite low if the observed fatalities
had occurred in close proximity to the actual death anyway, but for another reason.
Epidemiological studies suggest that around one half of all individuals having smoked
for many years die earlier because of the consequences of tobacco consumption and
that on average smokers lose about 10 life years (Doll et al., 2004). On the one
hand, given the strong correlation between smoking and other adverse health-related
behaviors, it is diﬃcult to isolate the impact of smoking. Consequently, the burden
associated with smoking might be smaller. On the other hand, since a comprehensive
assessment would also account for the external eﬀects of smoking on the health and
well-being of others, the true burden might even be more substantial.
The way in which modern societies organize their health and old-age insurance
generates an additional channel through which smokers might burden others with the
health consequences of smoking. This additional burden arises, since the treatment
of smoking-related health conditions typically leads to high health expenditures.
It might well turn out, though, that the net lifetime balance of contributions and
expenditures favors non-smokers, if - on the average - smokers die early enough5
to miss out on long spells of pension payments. Similarly, through tobacco taxes
smokers contribute disproportionately to state income. It is hardly straightforward
to assess the net balance of all these taxes and transfers.
In addition, the phenomenon has an important industrial facet. The tobacco multi-
nationals tend to act as strong antagonists of the supporters of a stronger tobacco
control, arguing that epidemiological assessments of the disease burden associated
with smoking are exaggerated and that excessive control measures threaten jobs
and economic prosperity. Their strong political inﬂuence is not only reﬂecting the
high persistence of demand for their major product cigarettes and the continuing
appeal of smoking to younger cohorts. It is also the oligopolistic structure of the
tobacco industry which is conducive to retaining a strong political inﬂuence. Hence,
a thorough analysis of the political possibilities to reduce tobacco consumption will
have to address the structure of the tobacco industry.
Before this background, this paper discusses the current state of knowledge regarding
the three most important questions in the design and implementation of economic
and health policy concerning smoking, (i) whether government action is justiﬁed at
all, (ii) what behavioral patterns this policy should try to alter, and (iii) whether the
policy measures chosen indeed exert any substantial eﬀects on the targeted outcomes.
We conclude that the case for control measures aiming at the prevention of smoking
initiation among adolescents is indeed strong, but also that their proper design would
beneﬁt from a better understanding of behavioral issues and that, by contrast to
current practice, their empirical evaluation would require (non-experimental) study
designs that facilitate the identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section gives an overview of the de-
mand for tobacco and also of the structure of the supply side as well as of regulations
implemented in Germany. Section 3 reviews the existing literature concerning be-
havioral aspects of smoking. Section 4 summarizes the empirical evidence on the
eﬀectiveness of tobacco control measures. Finally, section 5 concludes.6
2 Tobacco Consumption in Germany
2.1 The Demand Side
Smoking Prevalence
As in other developed economies, in Germany cigarettes are the most important
variety of tobacco products. In 2005, e19.5 billion (81% of the total value of tobacco
products sold) were spent on cigarettes, e3.7 billion (15.5%) on ﬁne cut, e0.6 billion
(3%) on cigars, and e0.1 billion (0.4%) on pipe tobacco (Statistisches Jahrbuch f¨ ur
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2006). These numbers correspond to 95.8 billion
cigarettes, 4 billion cigars, 33,200 tons of ﬁne cut, and 804 tons of pipe tobacco.
Figure 1 displays the development of per capita tobacco consumption in Germany
from 1970 up to 2005 (Statistisches Jahrbuch f¨ ur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
various editions, 1973-2005; Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik, 1990). The number of cigarettes per capita in West Germany ﬂuctuated
around an almost constant trend of about 2000 cigarettes between 1970 and 1990,
whereas per capita cigarette consumption in East Germany steadily increased from
about 1,300 cigarettes in 1970 to about 1,850 cigarettes before German reuniﬁcation
in 1990.
In uniﬁed Germany, cigarette consumption underwent some remarkable changes.
During the ﬁrst years after reuniﬁcation, per capita cigarette consumption sharply
declined, but then ﬂuctuated around a level of about 1,700 cigarettes up to 2003.
Three subsequent tax increases of about 1 cent per cigarette, respectively, were
enacted between 2002 and 2004. This obviously made cigarettes less attractive, as
per capita cigarette consumption steeply declined to about 1,200 cigarettes in 2005.
Since 1990, the consumption pattern of ﬁne cut, whose tax is much lower than for
cigarettes, has been exactly opposite to that of cigarettes.
Several surveys of individual consumers facilitate the analysis of the structure of
tobacco consumption in Germany.1 In our own analysis, we refer to the 1992, 1995,
1The most important surveys are the Mikrozensus collected by the Federal Statistical Oﬃce of
Germany, the National Health Survey compiled by the Robert-Koch Institute, the drug aﬃnity
studies carried out by the Federal Center for Health Education (BZgA), and the German Socio
Economic Panel (GSOEP) provided by the DIW Berlin.7
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Figure 1: Per Capita Tobacco Consumption in Germany
1999 and 2003 cross-sections of the German Mikrozensus.2 Overall, the percentage of
female respondents who answered to smoke either occasionally or regularly remained
almost constant between 1992 and 2003 at a level of about 22%. By contrast,
smoking prevalence among males steadily decreased from about 37% to about 33%.
Figures 2 (women) and 3 (men) document that there is a distinct age proﬁle to
smoking prevalence, with moderate (yet still disconcerting) smoking rates among
adolescents, a peak at young adult age and a slow decline towards middle age, when
smoking-related deaths are presumably already reducing the number of smokers
faster than that of non-smokers. They are lowest in old-age, reﬂecting among other
factors the relatively low life expectancy of smokers.3
2The Mikrozensus is a one percent random sample of all households in Germany with approx-
imately 500,000 observations in each cross-section. For further information see German Social
Science Infrastructure Services (n.d.). In all four waves there was a special voluntary questionnaire
on health-related information administered to a sub-sample covering 0.5 percent of the population.
Approximately 200,000 respondents answered these questionnaires in each wave.
3Ideally, this information on smoking prevalence should be supplemented by data on smoking
intensity. The Mikrozensus does not comprise information on the exact number of cigarettes
smoked. According to the National Health Surveys of 1990/1992 and 1998 the number of cigarettes
smoked decreased for West-German smokers in almost all age groups (except those 60 to 69 years
old) (Junge and Nagel, 1999), while no clear pattern emerges for East Germany.8
For both men and women, in 2003, the observed smoking rate was the highest
among individuals aged 20 to 24 (about 46% and 35%, respectively). A decade
earlier smoking rates peaked in the 30 to 34 age bracket, though. One explanation
for this phenomenon might be a diﬀerent starting behavior: a comparison of the
1992 participation rates with the rates in 2003 reveals that smoking participation
increased for youngsters in the age group 15 to 24 years4 and decreased for all men
and women aged 25 to 39. Moreover, while there was only little movement for men
between 40 and 59, smoking rates for women in this age group increased, particularly
among women between 45 and 59. This increase was particularly remarkable among
East German women.5
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Figure 2: Smoking Rates by Age Group - Women
Quite obviously, three diﬀerent factors interact in shaping these cross-sectional pro-
ﬁles. First, and perhaps most important, for all birth cohorts, there seems to be a
4A youth study of the BZgA concludes that smoking rates among the 16-19 years old individuals
slightly increased between 1993 and 1997 from 43% to 47%, but decreased afterwards until it
reached in 2003 again the level of 43%. It is unclear why the numbers of the BZgA are that much
higher. Partly this might be due to the possibility of proxy interviews within the Mikrozensus given
by parents for their children. However, it is unlikely that the bias from proxy interviews diﬀered
from wave to wave. The BZgA further concludes that among the 12-15 years old individuals the
smoking participation rate increased from 11% in 1993 to 19% in 2001 and then decreased to 14%
in 2003 (Christiansen and T¨ oppich, 2006).
5As the 1992 Mikrozensus is not available as a scientiﬁc use ﬁle, a separate analysis of smoking
rates for East and West Germans could be carried out only for 1995, 1999, and 2003.9
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Figure 3: Smoking Rates by Age Group - Men
distinct proﬁle of smoking prevalence across the life cycle. Children do not smoke,
and therefore the number of smokers who recently started smoking dominate preva-
lence rates among adolescents and young adults. Not many people start smoking
after their early twenties (see below), but some smokers give up on smoking as they
become older. These patterns of initiation and cessation are likely to produce a
single-peaked lifetime proﬁle of smoking prevalence. Second, there seem to be gen-
eral shifts to these patterns, due to variations in health consciousness, wealth, and
perhaps tobacco control policies. Some shifts might persistently inﬂuence the be-
havior of a generation over their complete life cycle, presumably most importantly
through a reduction of take-up rates in adolescence (cohort eﬀects). Other factors
might aﬀect the take-up and exit behavior of (potential) smokers across all age
groups simultaneously (period eﬀects). These diﬀerent eﬀects are diﬃcult to isolate
empirically from one another, though.
The Socioeconomic Gradient
The epidemiological analysis of smoking participation emphasizes a strong socio-
economic gradient to smoking behavior. Smokers are typically less educated, have
lower income and are more often unemployed or on social security. For Germany see,
e.g., Helmert et al. (1997), Helmert and Maschewsky-Schneider (1998), Helmert and
Borgers (1998), Helmert (1999), Knopf et al. (1999), Helmert et al. (2001), Lampert10
and Kroll (2005), or for multivariate analyses Lampert and Thamm (2004) and
G¨ ohlmann (2007b). The most obvious factor to look for is education. G¨ ohlmann
(2007b) concludes that the likelihood of being a smoker is 5 to 9 percentage points
higher for women with only a basic school degree compared to women with a high
school degree. Among men, this diﬀerence is even larger and amounts to about 10
to 15 percentage points.
In addition to education, other factors are strongly correlated with smoking rates.
Speciﬁcally, the probability to smoke is 6 to 10 percentage points higher for unem-
ployed women compared to women not participating in the labor market, whereas
unemployed men exhibit a 9 to 17 percentage points higher probability. Comparing
individuals with a monthly equivalent income of less than e1,000 with individuals
having an income of more than e1,500 results indicate a diﬀerence in the proba-
bility of smoking of 3 to 9 percentage points among the less aﬄuent. Finally, the
probability to smoke is also substantially higher for divorced or widowed individu-
als, with a diﬀerence of 11 to 18 percentage points compared to married individuals.
G¨ ohlmann (2007b) also demonstrates that the demand for cigarettes conditional on
being a smoker is larger among less educated, unemployed, and divorced respon-
dents.
Although in the literature these factors are often called ”social determinants” of
smoking behavior, it is quite obvious that these correlations do not support a causal
interpretation. It is certainly possible to tell a story illustrating a causal link from
certain lifetime events to smoking initiation or cessation. It might well be, for
instance, that the stressful event of a job loss leads some workers to take up smoking.
Yet, both labor market success and smoking behavior are outcomes of complex
behavioral processes at the individual level. Thus, they reﬂect other factors, such
as patience, motivation, and self-restraint, which are not (easily) observable to the
researcher.
Consequently, pinning down the causal eﬀect of one outcome (e.g. unemployment)
on the other (smoking) empirically is extremely diﬃcult. These correlations are
therefore hardly a reliable guide to policy recommendations. Nevertheless, they oﬀer
useful descriptive information, most interestingly on the strong correlation between
education and smoking behavior. The crucial research question to be addressed
by future research is, whether providing better education is a promising channel to11
reduce the number of youngsters (or adults) who start smoking. This is far from
obvious.
Smoking Initiation and Cessation
Because of the the high persistence of tobacco consumption - individuals who seri-
ously start smoking typically stay smokers for a long time - changes in the smoking
rates of the total population over time reﬂect any substantial alteration in the start-
ing behavior of successive cohorts. In Germany, the average starting age among
ever-smokers decreased from cohort to cohort: among men the average declined
from 17.6 for males born between 1950-1954 to 16.6 for males born between 1975-
1979; among women it declined from 18.8 for females born between 1950-1954 to
16.5 for females born between 1975-1979 (G¨ ohlmann, 2007a). Young adults (up
to their early twenties) who did not start smoking before, typically do no take up
smoking in later years. Less is known about the age structure of cessation rates.
Reﬂecting its high relevance for health policy, a growing literature investigates the
correlates of individuals’ take-up behavior. A sizeable number of these empirical
analyses of starting behavior applies discrete choice models to micro-level data,
where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for recent smoking participation
among youths (see, e.g., Chaloupka and Grossman, 1996; Chaloupka and Wechsler,
1997; Tauras and Chaloupka, 1999b; Chaloupka and Pacula, 1999; Gruber and Zin-
man, 2000; DeCicca et al., 2002; Bantle and Haisken-DeNew, 2002). Typically, these
studies only use characteristics (most importantly prices) as of survey time, while
ideally, these determinants would be observed when the respondents were exposed
to the temptation.
The second strand of this literature estimates duration models, where duration is
deﬁned as the time until an individual starts smoking (see, e.g., Douglas and Har-
iharan, 1994; Jones, 1995; Douglas, 1998; Forster and Jones, 2001; Lopez-Nicolas,
2002; DeCicca et al., 2002; Madden, 2007). Typically, these studies do not control
for socio-demographic characteristics at the time of take-up, and focus on the role of
prices on the decision to start smoking. Based on data from the GSOEP, the results
of G¨ ohlmann (2007a) indicate that among adolescents those with higher education
are less likely to start. Parental variables are highly correlated with take-up rates.
Speciﬁcally, when parents smoke throughout the whole childhood, this signiﬁcantly12
increases their children’s probability to start and tends to shorten time until starting
smoking. The hazard of starting further decreases with income, whereas no robust
eﬀects are found regarding parental education and labor market status.
Early studies of smoking cessation estimated the probability to quit as a function
of socio-demographic characteristics (see, e.g., Jones, 1994; Harris and Harris, 1996;
Helmert et al., 1999). However, similar to studies regarding smoking initiation, these
analyses also tend to suﬀer from the fact that socio-demographic characteristics are
observed at the time of the survey and not at the time individuals decide to quit.
More recent contributions usually employ duration models. Breslau and Peterson
(1996) and Tauras and Chaloupka (1999a) estimate Cox hazard models, whereas
van Ours (2006) estimates mixed proportional hazard models and Douglas (1998),
Forster and Jones (2001), Lopez-Nicolas (2002), and Madden (2007) specify a range
of parametric models like the Weibull and generalized gamma. Except the analysis
of Tauras and Chaloupka (1999a), all of these contributions are based on a cross-
section survey including retrospective information.
In a recent contribution, van Ours (2006) concludes that the earlier individuals start
consuming a drug, the less likely they are to quit. Tauras and Chaloupka (1999a)
ﬁnd real prices to have a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on the hazard of quitting.
While smoking bans have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on this hazard among males, there
is a signiﬁcant eﬀect of a private workplace smoking ban on employed females.
Furthermore, accounting for other correlates, among males the hazard decreases
with age and it is higher among single males compared to males who are engaged
or separated/divorced.
2.2 The Supply Side
With worldwide about 1.5 million employed workers and more than ﬁve trillion
cigarettes produced per year the tobacco industry is an important economic and
political force (Mackay et al., 2006). Approximately a third of the world market is
held by China National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC), China’s state monopolist.
The world’s next largest tobacco company is Altria, the parent company of Philip13
Morris USA and Philip Morris International.6 Its world market share was about 18%
in 2003, followed by British American Tobacco (BAT) with 15%, Japan Tobacco
Inc. (JTI) with 6%, Imperial Tobacco Group Limited (ITL) with 4% and, ﬁnally,
Gallaher Group Plc with 3% market share. Over time, the industry is characterized
by an increasing concentration process. In 2006, these companies generated proﬁts of
between 1 and 13 billion US dollars. These proﬁts reﬂected return on sales between
7 and 42 percent (see Table 1).
Table 1: Proﬁt Numbers of Tobacco Companies in 2006
Proﬁt from operations Return on sales***
in billion US dollars in percent
Altria* 13.27 19.9
BAT 5.14** 26.9
Gallaher 1.29** 24.1
ITL 2.57** 41.5
JTI* 2.47** 6.8
Notes: * Numbers for proﬁt from operations and return on sales belong to the tobacco segment. ** Based on
exchange rate at 03/21/2007. *** Calculated as ’proﬁt from operations / revenues excluding excise taxes’.
Sources: Annual reports.
In 2005 the German tobacco industry, comprising 23 tobacco (not only cigarette)
manufacturing companies, employed about 12,000 workers and generated a revenue
(excluding sales tax) of about e19.4 billion (2004: e22.2 billion). In total, the
value of tobacco products sold amounted to e24 billion leading to tax revenues of
about e14.4 billion, about 3.3% of all tax revenues of the Federal Government, the
L¨ ander, and municipalities (Statistisches Jahrbuch f¨ ur die Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land, 2006). The amount the tobacco industry spent on advertising alone totaled
about e180 million in 2005 (Drogen- und Suchtbericht 2007).
In 2005, Philip Morris GmbH, British American Tobacco Germany GmbH,
Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken GmbH, Gallaher Deutschland GmbH, and JT In-
ternational Germany GmbH produced together 92% of all cigarettes sold in Ger-
many (Table 2). Market leader was the Philip Morris GmbH, followed by BAT and
Reemtsma (a company of the ITL). The high concentration of this industry is also
reﬂected by the Herﬁndahl-Index. This index, deﬁned as H =
N
i=1 p2
i, where pi
is the market share of company i (i =1 ,...,N), amounts for the German tobacco
6In December 2005, Altria and CNTC reached an agreement that Altria is allowed to produce
and sell their brand Marlboro in China.14
industry to about 0.26. According to the US Antitrust Division of the US Depart-
ment of Justice an index larger than 0.18 indicates a concentrated industry (US
Department of Justice, n.d.). Up to 2007 the tobacco industry was represented by
the ”Verband der Cigarettenindustrie e.V.” (VDC), a lobby group that represented
the interests of all seven German cigarette manufacturers. However, after Philip
Morris had announced in May 2007 to leave the association at the end of the year,
in June 2007 the association decided its termination.
Table 2: Overview of Tobacco Companies in Germany 2006
Domestic Sales Factories Employment Main Brands
Philip Morris GmbH
34,3Billions Berlin, Munich, Dresden 2827 Marlboro, Philip Morris, L&M, f6, Next
British American Tobacco Germany GmbH
22,9Billions Bayreuth 2067 Lucky Strike, Pall Mall, HB, Lord, Prince,
Winﬁeld, Gauloises Blondes, Dunhill
Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken GmbH
19,5Billions Berlin, Langenhagen 1853 West, Davidoﬀ, John Player Special,
Peter Stuyvesant, R1, Cabinet
Gallaher Deutschland GmbH
6,9Billions - 36 Benson & Hedges, Nil, Ronson, Silk Cut
JT International Germany GmbH
2,9Billions Trier 1470 Camel, Winston, Reyno, Club
Tabak- und Cigarettenfabrik Heintz von Landewyck GmbH
0,5Billions Trier 279 Ducal, Afri-Filter, Elixyr, Tolerance
Joh. Wilh. von Eicken GmbH
0,4Billions L¨ ubeck, Dingelst¨ adt 414 Burton, Manitou, Excite, Springwater
Source: Verband der Cigarettenindustrie (n.d.a)
2.3 Prices, Taxes and Regulations
Prices and Taxes
Taxes are a major factor in the cigarette price paid by German smokers. Since the
ﬁrst oil crisis in 1973 the nominal price of cigarettes has steadily increased (Figure
4). However, the real price of cigarettes remained almost constant at its 1973 level
up to 2001. From 1973 to 2005 the ratio of tax to retail price (i.e. gross price minus
sales tax) ﬂuctuated between 62% and 70%, with sharp increases in 1982 and 2002
(Figure 4).7 Including sales tax, the total tax burden on a cigarette amounted to
7Sources: Statistisches Jahrbuch f¨ ur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, various editions (1973-15
about 78% at the end of the year 2005. In addition to sales taxes, tobacco taxes
comprise a quantity and a price component.8
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Figure 4: Development of Cigarette Prices and Taxes in Germany
As with any other heavily taxed product, illegal activities are an important issue.
Naturally, the current extent of cigarette smuggling can only be estimated. For 2006,
the VDC estimates the percentage of cigarettes not taxed in Germany, compared to
the total number of cigarettes consumed, to approximately 33.6% for East Germany
(in 2005: 30.6%) and roughly 15.7% in West Germany (in 2005: 11.3%) (Verband der
Cigarettenindustrie, n.d.b). The study of the VDC is based on the examination of
about 12,000 disposed cigarette packs that were collected and analyzed with regard
to their revenue stamps.
Regulations - Advertising, Warnings, and Information
Reﬂecting the contrast between the information content of ads and public health
concerns, the rigidity of advertising regulations has changed over time. In 1966 the
tobacco industry has voluntarily committed itself to limit the size and density of
posters and advertisements in newspapers and magazines.9 Moreover, the industry
2005); Fachserie 14, Reihe 9.1.1 and 9.1.2, Fachserie L, Reihe 8, various editions (1973-2006) and
German Tobacco Duty Law.
8Since September 2005 this tax for cigarettes has amounted to 8.27 Cent per piece and 25.29%
of the retail price.
9Published in the ’Bundesanzeiger’, no. 229, 12/07/1972. See also Verband der Cigarettenin-16
agreed to diﬀerent qualitative restrictions, in particular not to focus on youths,
not to place advertisements in youth magazines, sporting venues, and in public
transfer, and to display warnings and information on nicotine and tar values in
press advertisements and posters. Since 1974 advertising in radio and tv has been
forbidden by law.10 Moreover, advertisements must not give the impression that the
consumption of tobacco products positively aﬀects health or that tobacco products
are natural or pure.
In 1993 the tobacco industry extended its commitments, for instance not to dis-
tribute free samples in public.11 In 2002 commercials for tobacco products in cinemas
have become more restricted (§ 11V, JuSchG). In 2003 the European Parliament and
the Council of Ministers passed a directive that prohibits advertisements in press
media, other print media and information society services – with a few exceptions
– as well as the sponsoring of broadcasting programmes and many events (directive
2003/33/EG). Finally, the ”Verordnung ¨ uber Tabakerzeugnisse” from 1977, that was
amended in 1982 and 2002, stipulates that a particular health warning has to be
added to tobacco products and that the nicotine and tar content has to be displayed
on packs.
Regulations - Youth Access and Smoking Bans
The purchase and consumption of tobacco products by youths is heavily restricted.
German law12 stipulates that children and youths under the age of 16 are not allowed
to smoke in public. In addition, the ”Jugendschutzgesetz (JuSchG)” from 2002 fur-
ther stipulates that neither restaurants nor retail shops are permitted to give tobacco
products to children or youths younger than 16 (§ 10). Moreover, cigarette vending
machines may be installed only if they are inaccessible to individuals younger than
16. Since January 2007 vending machines have been adapted to request age proof
by the buyer using her or his eurocheque card. It is obvious that young smokers will
have an easy time circumventing these hurdles.
An increasing number of regulations bans smoking from public places and institu-
tions. An overall smoking ban at schools was ﬁrstly implemented by the federal
state Berlin in 2004 followed by Hessen half a year later. In 2004 the German
dustrie (n.d.c).
10§ 22, Lebensmittel- und Bedarfsgegenst¨ andegesetz (LMBG).
11Published in ’Pressemitteilung Nr. 41, Bundesministerium f¨ ur Gesundheit, 04/29/1993.
12§ 9 of the ”Gesetz zum Schutz der Jugend in der ¨ Oﬀentlichkeit (J¨ OSchG)” from 1985.17
government passed a law (”Verordnung ¨ uber Arbeitsst¨ atten”) that places an obli-
gation on employers to taking the necessary steps in order to protect non-smoking
employees at their place of work against the health risk of tobacco smoke (§5I).
In addition, another law bans smoking in all public sector buildings of the Federal
Government, in public transport (also taxis), and at train stations of the public
railway (”Bundesnichtraucherschutzgesetz”). This law further stipulates that from
September 2007 onwards the minimum age to smoke in public and to get tobacco
products will be increased from 16 to 18 years. The states agreed in March 2007
to ban smoking without exception in public oﬃces, in educational, cultural, and
health institutions, public transport as well as discotheques. The majority of Land
ministers agreed to allow smoking in restaurants only in separated rooms.
3 Behavioral Aspects
While it is advisable to accept the evidence that smoking causes severe adverse
health eﬀects, it is far from obvious that governments are justiﬁed or even obliged
to implement measures of tobacco control to mitigate these eﬀects. The economics
literature has debated this issue heavily, with the main aspects being those of ratio-
nality and regret. There seems to be a particularly strong case for control measures
aiming at the prevention smoking initiation among adolescents. Furthermore, it is
unclear how to aggregate beneﬁts and costs of smoking and of measures of tobacco
control, as even the individual-level consequences of both seem diﬃcult to capture.
In addition, one needs to reﬂect on the issue of external eﬀects on non-smokers.
Finally, the proper design of policy measures requires a deep understanding of be-
havioral issues, such as the role of peer group eﬀects. These are the issues addressed
in this section of the paper.
3.1 Information Processing and Addiction
Chaloupka and Warner (1999) point out that models explaining consumer decisions
regarding addictive goods have only been developed quite recently. These models
motivate individual addictive behavior through one of three routes: (i) imperfectly
rational models, (ii) models of myopic addictive behavior (habit persistence), and
(iii) models of rational addictive behavior. The idea of imperfectly rational models18
is that individuals have stable but inconsistent short-run and long-run preferences
(Chaloupka and Warner, 1999) or according to Thaler and Shefrin (1981) that in-
dividuals are at any time both ”farsighted planner and myopic doer”. In contrast,
myopic models assume that individuals know about the dependence between past
and current consumption of addictive goods, but do not consider the eﬀect of past
and current on future consumption when making decisions on current consumption
(Pollak, 1975). Empirical studies estimating the eﬀect of past consumption or prices
on current consumption conclude that past and current consumption are comple-
ments, i.e. that smoking is an addictive behavior. For an overview of analyses
regarding myopic models see, e.g., Chaloupka and Warner (1999).
The third category comprises models of rational addiction. The main idea is that
individuals do not only consider the eﬀect of past consumption but also of future con-
sumption on current consumption. Nonetheless, rational addiction models also allow
for a high discount rate of the considered eﬀect of future consumption (Chaloupka
and Warner, 1999). The key model within this category is the model of rational
addiction suggested by Becker and Murphy (1988). In this model, every individ-
ual maximizes her or his utility consistently over time taking into account also
future harmful consequences of their current decisions. Notwithstanding method-
ological diﬀerences in their study design, almost all studies testing the implications
of the model of rational addiction empirically (see, e.g., Chaloupka, 1990, 1991, 1992;
Keeler et al., 1993; Becker et al., 1994; Sung et al., 1994; Duﬀy, 1996; Labeaga, 1999;
Baltagi and Griﬃn, 2001) support the rational addiction model. This would suggest
that the fact that smokers impose enormous costs on themselves does not give a
mandate for government action (Gruber, 2001).
Yet, the theory of rational addiction has been criticized because most smokers appar-
ently regret having started smoking instead of being ”happy addicts” (Orphanides
and Zervos, 1995). As a consequence, several authors modiﬁed the rational addic-
tion approach by (i) relaxing the assumption of perfect foresight (Orphanides and
Zervos, 1995), (ii) implementing quitting costs, considering the fact that adverse
health eﬀects of smoking usually occur late in life and assuming bounded rationality
of individuals (Suranovic et al., 1999), and (iii) allowing for endogenous time pref-
erences (Becker and Mulligan, 1997) or time-inconsistent preferences (Gruber and
K¨ oszegi, 2001).19
Orphanides and Zervos (1995) try to explain the phenomenon of regret by introduc-
ing uncertainty about the adverse eﬀects of smoking. The main idea is that rational
individuals start experimenting with smoking because they face uncertainty whether
they will actually suﬀer from harmful eﬀects of smoking or not. Some of those with
a predisposition for addiction will learn about their addictive potential before they
become addicted, but others will be ”hooked” into addiction before they realize
their addictive potential. The latter, thus, will regret their decision to have started
smoking and their initial assessment of the potential harm of tobacco consump-
tion. Within this model, addiction is indeed voluntary, but not intentional. In this
context, Hammar and Johansson-Stenman (2004) conclude that smokers seem to
underestimate the health risk of smoking.
In the model of Suranovic et al. (1999) regret arises because smokers are assumed
to make choices only for the current moment. Thus, the individual is ”boundedly
rational” in the sense that she or he takes into account future consequences of her
or his consumption decision, but heavily discounts future losses. After a while
addiction emerges, leading to withdrawal costs, if smokers try to quit. Because of
these adjustment costs, it might be optimal for a utility maximizing individual not
to quit despite any regret about having started smoking, making him an unhappy
addict. In that case, a government which succeeds in preventing young individuals
from starting smoking will help them avoid a behavioral trap. Supporting this
view, Yen and Jones (1996) ﬁnd empirical evidence that withdrawal costs aﬀect the
decision of heavy smokers whether or not to quit.
Objecting to these approaches, Becker and Mulligan (1997) argue that time prefer-
ence might itself be aﬀected by addiction, i.e. individuals who became addicted
might weight the future less because of their addiction. Similarly, Gruber and
K¨ oszegi (2001) argue that forward-looking individuals do not necessarily have time-
consistent preferences. Their theoretical model extends the rational addiction model
to time-inconsistent preferences. Time-inconsistent agents tend to use self-control
devices to overcome their time-inconsistent tendencies. Whether individuals have
time-consistent or time-inconsistent preferences has very diﬀerent implications for
governmental policy. Time-inconsistent individuals might even appreciate tax in-
creases, because those could act as a self-control device helping them to quit smoking.
Thus, there might be an argument for governmental interventions, in contrast to the
standard rational addiction model. In support of this view Gruber and Mullainathan20
(2002) conclude that both laboratory experiments and their own analysis indicate
that consumers are indeed time-inconsistent.
3.2 Welfare Reﬂections
The question whether welfare considerations should include the ”beneﬁts” of smok-
ing arising from reduced pension payments or reduced health care utilization at
older ages because of premature death is a controversial issue. Manning et al. (1989)
and Viscusi (1995), for example, conclude that the inclusion of these beneﬁts make
”smokers pay their way”, i.e. they bear the external costs caused by their smoking
behavior. However, this argument neither covers the health costs that arise because
pregnant women harm their embryo nor may it adequately consider costs caused
by second-hand smoking(Gruber, 2001). Available studies estimating the costs of
smoking for Germany are based on the ”prevalence approach”, i.e. the costs com-
prise the present value associated with all existing cases of smoking-produced illness
including future lost earnings because of premature death attributable to current
deaths (Chaloupka and Warner, 1999). Welte et al. (2000) estimate the costs at-
tributable to smoking in 1993 to about e17.3 billion, Ruﬀ et al. (2000) to about
e16.6 billion in 1996, and Neubauer et al. (2006) report an estimate of about e21.0
billion in 2003. For an overview of estimates for other countries see, e.g., Chaloupka
and Warner (1999) or Warner et al. (1999).
3.3 Peer Group Eﬀects
The behavior of adolescents is inﬂuenced by a variety of factors, ranging from genetic
predisposition to the media. Most importantly, their parents and their friends both
seem to exert decisive inﬂuences on youngsters’ choices. Parents are typically the
dominant point of reference in early life, while teachers and classmates join them
in this role later on. The inﬂuence of peer groups, i.e. those youngsters who form
the inner circle of friends and associates, might indeed be the most important factor
in shaping smoking behavior. Yet, at a conceptual level the genuine nature of this
inﬂuence is diﬃcult to capture. While it is true that groups of similar people tend to
behave in similar fashion, this might both reﬂect the behavioral homogeneity of the
individuals joining these groups and the (causal) inﬂuence of the typical behavior in
the group on individual choices. It is immediately clear that it will be most diﬃcult21
to disentangle these two mechanisms empirically.
In his seminal contribution, Manski (1993) even distinguishes three diﬀerent eﬀects.
Individual behavior might reﬂect the characteristics of the individuals forming the
peer group (”contextual eﬀects”), it might be inﬂuenced by the prevalence of that
behavior in the peer group (”endogenous eﬀects”) and, moreover, by factors common
to the peer group, but unobserved by the researcher (”correlated eﬀects”). These
factors may have inﬂuenced selection into the group in the ﬁrst place, or they might
reﬂect common shocks. As Manski (1993) and, more recently, Krauth (2006) point
out, simple reduced-form models where individual behavior is modeled as a function
of observable individual characteristics as well as the average behavior within the
peer group or, alternatively, the peer group average of background characteristics,
fail to identify the endogenous peer group eﬀect. Most speciﬁcally, what appears to
be endogeneity might simply reﬂect unobserved heterogeneity at the group level.
To address this identiﬁcation problem, one could exploit situations in which indi-
viduals are randomly assigned to groups (see, e.g., Sacerdote, 2001), hoping that
these groups are not confronted with unobserved common shocks. As an alterna-
tive, Krauth (2006, forthcoming) suggests estimating endogenous eﬀects by using
a structural approach. Other studies utilize instrumental variables (Norton et al.,
1998; Gaviria and Raphael, 2001; Powell et al., 2005). However, it is diﬃcult to
ﬁnd any instrument that aﬀects the behavior of the peer group but not own be-
havior. Furthermore, it is often diﬃcult to identify the peer group. In the context
of smoking initiation, this might be only close friends, but also youths going to the
same school more generally. Typically these studies ﬁnd signiﬁcant endogenous peer
eﬀects. However, their estimated size is generally much smaller than the estimates
of simple reduced-form models.
In contrast to the diﬃculties in measuring peer eﬀects, the eﬀect of paternal smoking
on children’s smoking behavior is easier to identify, since parental smoking behavior
might be considered to be exogenous. Generally, studies of intergenerational trans-
mission state that there exists a signiﬁcant, positive correlation between parental
and children’s smoking behavior for Germany (see, e.g., Bantle and Haisken-DeNew,
2002; Tauchmann et al., 2006; G¨ ohlmann, 2007a). This correlation does not tell us,
whether the underlying behavioral channel of transmission is rather imitation or ge-
netic disposition. It might nevertheless suggest that health policy needs to address22
parental behavior together with that of adolescents, if the prevention of take-up is
its objective.
4 Control of Tobacco Consumption
Economic policy aiming at reducing tobacco consumption can address three related
targets: (i) preventing youths from starting, (ii) reducing tobacco consumption of
smokers, and (iii) helping smokers to quit smoking. The instruments available to
pursue these targets comprise (i) price interventions via taxes, (ii) the provision of
information via education or counter-advertising, or restrictions on advertising, and
(iii) regulation of production and consumption of tobacco products. The most im-
portant empirical question in the design and implementation of economic and health
policy is, whether policy measures indeed exert any substantial eﬀects on the tar-
geted outcomes. Even the most carefully designed and most diligently implemented
intervention might fail to work. Yet, the answer to this question is notoriously
diﬃcult to give. Thus, policy evaluation has arguably become the most intensely
debated issue in modern empirical economics (Schmidt, 2007), and also in health
economics.
A related question is, whether any successful tobacco control measure might display
unintended side eﬀects. Individuals might compensate an induced reduction in to-
bacco consumption by a corresponding increase in the consumption of, for example,
alcohol or marijuana (see, e.g., Jones, 1989; Florkowski and McNamara, 1992; Goel
and Morey, 1995; Jimenez and Labeaga, 1994; Dee, 1999; Decker and Schwartz, 2000;
Cameron and Williams, 2001; Bask and Melkerson, 2004; Zhao and Harris, 2004; Pi-
cone et al., 2004; Tauchmann et al., 2006). Estimating systems of demand functions
and calculating cross-price eﬀects or by using alternative approaches these studies
usually ﬁnd that tobacco and alcohol, but also tobacco and marijuana/cannabis are
complements in consumption. Thus, it seems to be unlikely that tobacco control
measures have negative side eﬀects regarding the use of other drugs.
4.1 Taxes and Prices
In principle, tax increases are a promising instrument to reduce tobacco consump-
tion, regarding the smoking intensity of current smokers and, probably more im-23
portantly, the take-up rates of youngsters. A key aspect for their eﬀectiveness is
the price elasticity of the demand for tobacco products. Unfortunately, estimating
this elasticity is extremely diﬃcult: The main reason for the small number of stud-
ies attempting to estimate price eﬀects in Germany is the lack of (cross-sectional)
variation of prices, as typically all individuals in the data set face identical prices
at any given point in time. Even over time price variation has historically been
quite limited. Consequently, the prevailing evidence for Germany has been almost
entirely restricted to linking aggregate annual consumption of cigarettes to varia-
tions in the nominal cigarette price (see, e.g., K¨ orner et al., 1996; Deutsches Krebs-
forschungszentrum, 2002; van Deuverden, 2004). Using a series of before-after com-
parisons of smoking prevalence, but not controlling for any other factor, Hanewinkel
and Isensee (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) analyze the ﬁve recent tax increases in
Germany between 2002 and 2005 on the basis of micro data. While these studies
conclude that there were signiﬁcantly negative eﬀects of each of these increases on
the demand for tobacco, the particularly weak study design implies that they can
at best be viewed as suggestive.
For a comprehensive overview of macro-level studies regarding the price elasticity of
tobacco demand in the US and their shortcomings see, e.g., Chaloupka and Warner
(1999). Typically, these studies conclude that the overall price elasticity of cigarette
demand lies within a relatively small range centered at about -0.4. Individual-level
studies tend to conﬁrm this result. Apparently, price increases aﬀect the all or
nothing decision to smoke more intensely than they aﬀect the conditional demand
for cigarettes among smokers. Young people tend to react more strongly to price
increases. Estimating hazard models, however, Douglas and Hariharan (1994) con-
clude that there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect of prices on the decision to start smoking
(also see Douglas, 1998; DeCicca et al., 2002; Lopez-Nicolas, 2002). In contrast,
Forster and Jones (2001) ﬁnd indeed small but signiﬁcant price eﬀects on smoking
initiation for the UK. The results concerning the eﬀect of price increases on the
decision to quit seem to be robust, though, as Douglas (1998), Forster and Jones
(2001), and Lopez-Nicolas (2002) ﬁnd signiﬁcant price elasticities.24
4.2 Health Information and Education
Sometimes health information undoubtedly has large eﬀects. In 1953 a report by
the American Cancer Society and the British Medical Research Council stated that
smokers die signiﬁcantly earlier than nonsmokers. In 1964 the US Surgeon General’s
Report established a causal relationship between tobacco consumption and lung
cancer (Schneider et al., 1981). According to Chaloupka and Warner (1999), these
studies signiﬁcantly reduced smoking. Today the risks of smoking are commonly
known and thus, further information on adverse health eﬀects might have a smaller
impact. Nevertheless, it might be worthwhile to attempt improving this knowledge
in the population, especially among youngsters.
One way for governments to circulate information on adverse health eﬀects of smok-
ing is by marking cigarette packs with health warning labels. Somewhat discon-
certingly, empirical evidence on the eﬀects of such warnings on smoking behavior
suggests that health warning labels only lead, at best, to small reductions in smok-
ing (Chaloupka and Warner, 1999). Another way of disseminating information on
adverse health eﬀects of smoking is by launching mass media counter-advertising
campaigns, such as the two major counter-advertising campaigns in the US, (i) the
Fairness Doctrine of the Federal Communications Commission between 1967 and
1970 (see, e.g., Schneider et al., 1981; Baltagi and Levin, 1986), and (ii) the anti-
smoking media campaign in California in 1988 (see, e.g., Hu et al., 1995). In their
review of the literature Chaloupka and Warner (1999) conclude that econometric
analyses of such campaigns tend to ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative eﬀects on cigarette con-
sumption.
Other studies analyze counter-advertising eﬀects by comparing the smoking behavior
or attitudes of those who recognized a campaign with those who were not aware
of it (see, e.g., Kozlowski et al., 2000; Siegel and Biener, 2000). Yet, viewing anti-
smoking advertisements might be endogenous (Flay, 1987). Other studies compared
the eﬀects of campaigns that were assigned only to a particular region to comparable
regions which did not receive the campaign (see, e.g., Flynn et al., 1994; McVey and
Stapleton, 2000). Yet other studies used an experimental setting (Shiﬀman et al.,
2001). In general, most of these studies ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of counter-advertising
on smoking behavior. In addition, smoking prevention or cessation programmes
in schools might reduce smoking among youth. Although the empirical literature25
evaluating such programmes mostly ﬁnds signiﬁcant eﬀects in the short-run (e.g.
Botvin and Kantor, 2000; Sussman et al., 2001), there might not be a signiﬁcant
eﬀect in the long-run (see, e.g., Bruvold, 1993; World Bank, 1999).
Tobacco advertising has been strongly criticized for aﬀecting smoking behavior, par-
ticularly among the young. In consequence, this has often raised the claim for ad-
vertising bans. Yet, due to its encompassing nature, and since advertisers can easily
substitute between a range of diﬀerent media (Saﬀer and Chaloupka, 2000), with the
internet being a most relevant new medium (Cohen et al., 2001), the eﬀects of adver-
tising can hardly be assessed on the basis of aggregate time-series data or in simple
cross-country comparisons. The majority of studies modeled cigarette demand as
some function of cigarette advertising expenditures (Chaloupka and Warner, 1999).
Unfortunately, the results of studies using more promising individual-level data of
youths and self-reported time spent watching TV (Lewit et al., 1981) can hardly
be taken more seriously. More recent research aims at assessing the eﬀect of com-
prehensive advertising bans on smoking. The empirical ﬁndings are mixed as well
(see, e.g., Baltagi and Levin, 1986; Franke, 1994; Lewit et al., 1981; Schneider et al.,
1981).
4.3 Smoking Restrictions
Smoking restrictions at the workplace, in restaurants or at public places target
smokers and non-smokers alike. This universal coverage makes it extremely diﬃ-
cult to provide empirical evidence on its eﬀectiveness, as one cannot contrast the
smoking behavior of individuals who are covered by the regulation with those who
are not, yet who live in the same region at the same time period. If the contrast
is constructed over time, it is diﬃcult to isolate the eﬀect of the smoking ban from
general tendencies like an increased anti-smoking sentiment, that might have set up
the intellectual base for the implementation of the smoking ban in the ﬁrst place.
Using such aggregate data, Chaloupka and Saﬀer (1992) account for the endogene-
ity of smoking restrictions by using a two step least squares (2SLS) approach and
conclude that comprehensive public place smoking bans tend to decrease consump-
tion, while smoking bans at private workplaces are not found to have any signiﬁcant
eﬀect.
Other studies of public smoking bans use micro-level data (Chaloupka, 1992;26
Chaloupka and Pacula, 1999; DeCicca et al., 2002; Oshfeldt et al., 1998; Tauras
and Chaloupka, 1999a,b). They have, in principle, to confront the same identiﬁca-
tion problem, as variation in coverage is only across time and place, but not across
people in the same environment. This obstacle cannot be overcome convincingly by
the use of longitudinal data and the inclusion of individual as well as year and re-
gion ﬁxed eﬀects. Overall, these studies tend to provide mixed evidence. Using the
alternative study design of a choice experiment, Hammar and Carlsson (2005) con-
clude that smoking bans have almost no eﬀect on the probability to quit. Coverage
by smoking restrictions might vary substantially in the case of workplace smoking
bans, though. Attempting to control for self-selection of workers into ﬁrms with
bans, Evans et al. (1999) ﬁnd robust empirical evidence of a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
such bans on smoking prevalence as (also see Allwright et al., 2005; Farrelly et al.,
1999).
A special smoking restriction is the enactment of youth access laws. However, the
quest for empirical evidence again faces the obstacle of universal coverage. Existing
studies of the eﬀect of such laws do not solve this problem convincingly. They indi-
cate no signiﬁcant or only small eﬀects. Wasserman et al. (1991) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
eﬀect of the prohibition of the sale of cigarettes to minors, Chaloupka and Grossman
(1996) even ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive eﬀects of restrictions on vending machine sales.
Chaloupka and Pacula (1999) conclude that there is a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of
strictly enforced youth access laws but only among black youth. The big practical
problem of such restrictions is eﬀective enforcement. According to Deutsches Krebs-
forschungszentrum (2002) Germany is a country with a very high density of vending
machines (in 2005 about 1 vending machine per 120 inhabitants (Die Tabak Zeitung,
2007)). Up to 2007 the purchase of cigarettes from machines had not even required
any validation of user’s age. Thus, it is not surprising that German youths seem to
obtain their cigarettes mainly through this route (Deutsches Krebsforschungszen-
trum, 2002), either themselves or via their friends.
5 The Political Agenda
Starting from the insight that the international death toll linked to the consumption
of tobacco products is remarkable, this paper asks, whether this health burden
indeed warrants any government intervention, and questions the available evidence27
on the eﬀectiveness of the control measures that have been enacted so far. The
economic literature heavily debates the ﬁrst question, culminating in the concept of
rational addiction. Of all empirical tests of this concept, most studies apparently
support the notion that tobacco addiction is rational. Yet, since many smokers
later on regret having started smoking, it seems questionable that smokers had
actually considered all future consequences of their behavior at the time of take-up.
Moreover, the fact that smokers typically start when they are very young, provides
an additional argument for the proponents of government intervention.
Regarding the second question, this paper has discussed extensively, how diﬃcult it
is, in principle, to provide solid empirical evidence on the eﬀects of various control
measures currently in operation. Whether it’s prices and taxes, information policies,
or smoking restrictions, empirical analysis is hampered by the universal coverage of
any of these measures. The contrast between treated and untreated individuals,
and consequently, a convincing analogy to the hypothetical gold standard of a ran-
domized controlled trial, is diﬃcult to ﬁnd. Nevertheless, existing studies suggest
that tax increases have the potential to dampen tobacco consumption both among
youths but also among adults. Moreover, the implementation of tax increases is
not expensive. When it comes to information policy, it very much seems that it
might at best be possible to aﬀect the decision to start smoking, albeit to quite a
moderate extent. Finally, the eﬀect of smoking bans is open for debate. The het-
erogeneity of legal restrictions currently enacted in the various German states might
provide information that facilitates the generation of further empirical insights into
this issue.28
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